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EVIDENCE OF THREATS.
took lands for permanent use under
the Improvement Acts of 1825, 826,
1827 and 1828, and similar acts, and
constructed and operated a canal
upon it, she acquired an estate in
such land in perpetuity, and may
dispose of the same in fee.
When land is procured for the
building of a canal thereon the
piesumption is that the right of soil
is acquired, and not a mere ease-
ment. The Commonwealth sold
the canal to a corporation: Held,
that the fee in the land occupied by
the canal was in the Commonwealth
and passed to the corporation, and
that the former owner had no title
to it norto the coal underthe canal:
Wyoming Co. v. Price, 81 Pa., x56;
Robinson v. R. R. Co., 22 P. F. S.,
316; Union Canal Co. v. Young,
i Whart., 4IO Malone v. City of
Toledo, 34 Ohio, 541.
Where a corporation is author-
ized to acquire land in fee, either
by legal proceedings or purchase,
the property so acquired may, by
authority of the legislature, be de-
voted to a new and different public
use, after the use for which it was
originally acquired has been termi-
nated; or the land may be aliened
by the corporation. In such cases
no right of property of any individ-
hal is violated. The original owner
has no reversionary or other inter-
est in the land: Heard v. City of
Brooklyn, 6o N. Y., 242.
Wherever the Commonwealth, in
the construction of her public works,
acquires a fee simple in lands taken
therefor, and land is devoted to
that use, a cessation of that use
would not revest the title in the
former owner: Haldeman v. Penna.
Cen. R. R. Co., So Pa., 425. See,
alpo, Rexford v. Knight, ii N. Y.,
3o8; Pittsburgh & LT. B. R. R. -).
Bruce, 102 Pa., 23; Heywood v.
Mayor, 7 N. Y., 314.
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Evidence-Homicide-Threats.
Upon the trial of an indictment for homicide it appeared that the
defendant, some time after a personal encounter with the deceased, had
taken his position, rifle in hand, where he could see his victim but could
I Reported in 26 Ail. Rep., 199.
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not be seen by him. As the latter approached, the defendant fired at him
twice, the second shot inflicting a mortal wound. The deceased was
unarmed. Held, that it was not error to exclude evidence of threatd
previously made by the deceased to the effect that he intended to kill the
* defendant, since there was no evidence that the deceased made any
attack upon the defendant, or that the latter was in any imminent
danger.
Opinion by STiNESS, J.
BvhBNcZ Or THR.ZATS nq HoMicmE CASES.
* .' Can evidence," asks WHARTON
_(Crim. Uvid., 9th ed., 7S7), "to
the effect that the deceased, prior
to a homicide, threatened the de-
* fendant's life, be received; and if
so, is it a prerequisite to the proof
of such threats that they should be
. shown to have been communicated
to 'the defendant?" The learned
author proceeds to answer the ques-
tion, briefly referring to the many
cases in which the point has come
up for decision. It should seem to
' be. worth while to examine these
cases, and others, at greater length
and to attempt a careful' classifica-
tion of them.
I The' question may present itself
in three possible ways: (I) A
threatens B's life. B -hears of it
and kills A by way of precaution.
Is evidence of the threats admissi-
ble by way of justification? (2) A
threatens B's life. B hears of it,
anti in a subsequent personal en-
cdunte A .is killed. The question
is, which was the aggressor? Is evi-
dence of the threats admissible as
tending to prove thatA was? (3)
Vary the facts of (2) by supposing
B to have been ignorant of the
making of the threats. Is evidence
of them admissible?
(3) Evidence of threats against
defendant aslustifica tion for homi-
cide. The questions arising under
this head have been treated bytext
writers and courts alike as ques-
tions in the law of evidence. The
writer is unable to understand what
ground there is for such treatment.
The question here raised is, it is
submitted, not a question of reme-
dial, but of substaiztive law: it is to
be settled by a reference not to the
law of evidence, but to the princi-
ples of criminal law. Is it a justi-
fication for homicide that the de-
ceased threatened the life of the
defendant? If it is, of course evi-
dence-of the fact that threats were
made may be given. If it is not,
then the evidence will be excluded,
not because of any technical. rule
of evidence, but because the sub-
stantive law declares that the exist-
ence or non-existence of the fact
sought to be proved has no bear-
ing whatever on the rights of the
parties.
Thus in the principal case, while
the learned Judge obviously has in
mind the appropriate principles
upon which the decision should be
based, he yet thinks it proper to
discuss the pioblem before him
under the form of a question of
evidence. He might have said:
"The undisputed evidence shows
that there was no personal en-
counter and that; on the defend-
ant's own showing, the shooting
was done by way of precaution.
Such proceeding is without legal
justification. All the threats in the
world will not alter- the. aspect of
the defendant's act." What he did
say was, "taking the defendant's
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own statement, notwithstanding its
contradiction by other testimony,
as the basis for the evidence offered,
it was clarly inadmissible." As
above stated, it is clear from many
passages that the learned Judge had
the reason for the exclusion clearly
in mind, as witness the following:
"Under such circumstances, evi-
dence of previous threats was
plainly irrelevant, for they could
not justify the use of the deadly
weapon." It is only to be regret-
ted that he did not avoid every ap-
pearance of deciding upon the
basis of the law of evidence.
In the judgment of the writer
the treatment of a similar ques-
tion by RvLAND, J., in State v.
Hays, 23 Mo., 287 (1856), is to
be preferred: "Upon such a
transaction as this, what good to
the prisoner would. proof of pre-
vious threats against him by the
deceased have produced? Could
they have changed the facts? Could
they have altered the routine of
events in their melancholy detail?
Or would such threats have altered
the law? Surely not ..... Why,
then, offer this evidence of a loose
threat, without any date? It was
a mere after-thought, got up to dis-
-ract the jury with a collateral
matter utterly foreign to the issue
on trial, and was properly re-
jected."
It is, of course, clear that where,
as a matter of substantive law,
threats constitute a justification or
amountto a mitigating circum-
stance, they may be proved. Thus
in Meade's case (i Lewin's C. C.,
x84; Roscoe's Crim. Ev., 772, 5th
ed.), Meade's life and property
had been threatened the day befofe
the killing by a company of per-
sons of whom the deceased was one.
Meade, under an apprehension, as
he alleged, that his life and pro-
perty were in actual and immediate
danger, fired a pistol with deadly
effect. Evidence of the threats was
admitted, HOTROXD, J., saying to
the jury: "If you are of opinion
that Meade was really attacked,
and that Law and his party were on
the point of breaking into the
house, or likely to do so, and exe-
cute the threat of the day before,
he was, perhaps, justified in firing
as he did." A similar principle un-
derlies the decision in State v.
Keene, 50 Mo., 358 (1872). With
these cases may be compared Rec-
tor's case, 19 Wend., 569 (1838).
In that case the facts are somewhat
similar to Meade's case (supra),
except that the threats had been
made a week before the killing,
and the assailants Were not posi-
tively identified with the previous
rioters. COWEN, J., speaking for
the majority, thought the evidence
was admissible, it being a question
for the jury whether "the resistance
offered was out of hroortion to the
injury which there was reasonable
causefor aprehending." (p. 59o).
BRONSON, J., dissented, thinking
that it was competent for the Court
to declare, as a matter of law, that
threats made under the circum-
stances of this case constituted no
justification. The Chief Justice
(NELSON), while doubting if the
fact of such threats would exert
any influence on the minds of the
jury, hesitated to adopt the view of
the trial judge and of BRONSON, J.,
and concurred in ordering a new
trial.
(2) Evidence of threats commu-
nicated to defendant ofieredloproze
that the deceased was the assailant.
If the criminal law of any jurisdic-
tion accepts the plea of self-defnce
as a justification for murder,
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whether evidence offered by the-
defendant does or does, not support
that plea is never decided by any
rule of evidence. The substantive
law defines what is a justification
for murder and all evidence pro-
bative of that justification is admis-
sible.
It has been seen that B can never
justify the murder of A upon the
ground& that the latter threatened
the former's life: Smith v. Comm.
(Ky.), 4 S. W., 798; State v. Mc-
Cahift tIowa), 33 N. W., 599;" Phil-
lips v. State (Tex.), 2 S. W., 6oi;
State v. Partlow (Mo.), 4 S. W., 14.
Evidence, therefore, of threats made
by the deceased are very properly
rejected.
But if there has been any demon-
stration on the part of the deceased
at the time the mortal blow is
given this fact, when coupled with
the fact of defendant's knowledge
of the threats, may render the con-,
duct of the defendant justifiable,
though were no threats uttered, it
would -not be So.
In State v. Jackson, 32 S. C., 42,
the'deceased meeting the defendant -
upon a road made a movement of
his hand toward his hip pocket.
The defendant, who had heard of
murderous threats made by the de-
ceitsed, thought, erroneously, that
the diceased was about to draw a
revolver to execute the threat. It
was held that evidence of the
threats was admissible to prove
that the defendant's impression as
to the reality of his danger was
justifiable, taking into considera-
tion -his knowledge of the animins
of the deceased toward him.
If, under the circumstances of
the above case, there had been no
threats made by the deceased, the
killing certainly would not have
been justifiable, unless the danger
had been actually present. See
State v. Gibson (Ala.), 9 S., I;
State v. Turner, . S. . Rep., 723;
Watson v. Comm., 87 Va., 6o8; 13
S. E. Rep., 22; Comm. v. Barners
(Ky.), i6 S. E. Rep., 457.
Evidence of threats made by the
deceased are never admissible in
justification, where in the transac-
tion which results in the victim's
murder there has not been some
overt act or demonstration suffi.
ciently.aggressive tb impress the
defendant that the victim was about
to execute such threats. State v.
Howard, 14 S. E. Rep., 48r; Wat-
son v. Comm., 87 Va., 6o8; 13 S. E.
Rep., 22r; Gibson v. State, 91 Ala.,
64; Gonzales v. State (Tex.), 12 S.
W., 733; Bernard v. State, 88 Tenfi.,
183; 28 Tex. App., i3q; Price v.
People, 131 Ill., 223. If it is
affirmatively showzn that the de-
fendant fired the first shot, and the
demonstration of the deceased
occurred'after the event, evidence
of previously made threats is in-
admissible. State v. Brooks, 2 S.
Rep., 198.
It is thus seen that in discussing
the admissibility of threats made
by the deceased in justification of
his acts we are simply dealing with
a principle of criminal law, nt a
rule of evidence.
The character of the demonstra-
tions of the deceased upon en-
countering the defendant must im-
press the fatter with a sense of
danger. The danger need not be
real, but it miust be apparently
"imminent, urgent and pressing."
Price v. People, 131 Ill., 223; Gil-
more v. People, 124 III., 38o;
Hughes v. People, i16 Ill., 330;
Campbell v. Comm. (Ky.), I6 S.
W. Rep., 127.
In Smith v. Florida, 25 Fla., 517,
the deceased and defendant met on
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a public road. The defendant fired
and killed, alleging in justification
that the deceased had threatened to
take. defendant's life upon meeting
him. The evidence showed that
deceased was unarmed at the time;
that he did not approach the de-
fendant rapidly, and made no de-
monstration of any kind. It was
held that the evidence of the threat
was inadmissible, as the fear of the
defendant was cowardly and not a
reasonable outcome of the de-
ceased's conduct. See Wesley v.
State, 37 Miss., 327; Evans v. State,
44 liss., 762; Myers v. State, 3o
Tex., 527; Pritchett v. State, 22
Ala., 39.
Where there is no direct evidence
of whether the deceased or the de-
fendant was the assailant, no eye
witnesses to the encounter, but it
is known that both principals par-
ticipated, it is often well-nigh im-
possible to solve the question
without resorting to facts and cir-
cumstances antecedent to the en-
counter to show the animus of the
one to the other.
Take the class of cases of which
Wiggins v. People, 93 U. S., is the
type. A justifies the murder of B
upon the ground that B fired the
4lrst shot, and he killed him in self-
defense. At the encounter four
shots were knowa to have been
fired, of which three came from the
defendant's weapon. Upon arrest
two revolvers are found upon the
accused, one with three, and the
other with one of the chambers
emptied. It is in evidence that one
of these revolvers belonged to the
deceased and was picked up by A
immediately after the shooting.
The question was, whether A or B
fired the first dhot? The Supreme
Court said, in revL.sing the ruling
of the trial judge, who had re-
jected the evidence of threats (un-
communicated) made by the dc-
ceased:
"Now, when, under the circum-
stances, the witness, and the only
witness who was present at the en-
counter, swears that he cannot tell
where the first shot came from,
though he knows the defendant
only fired three, it must be very
apparent that if the person to whom
the deceased exhibited that pistol a
few minutes before the shooting
had been permitted to tell the jury
that deceased then said, 'he wouid
kill the defendant before he went
to bed that night,' it would have
tended strongly to show where that
first shot came from, and how that
pistol with one chamber emptied
came to be found on the ground."
See, also, Patillo v. State (Tex.), 3
S. W. Rep., 766.
This brings us to the third head
of the classification adopted at the
beginning of this article:
(3) .Does it matter that the threats
of the deceased are uncommunicated
to the defendant ? It has been seen
thatproof of threats made by the de-
ceased and brought to the knowl-
edge of the accused may be receiv-
ed as tending to show the evidence
of a belief in the mind of the ac-
cused that his life was in danger, or
that he had reason to apprehend
some great bodily harm from the
acts and motions of the deceased,
when in the absence of such threats,
such acts and motions would cause
no belief. In the leading case of
Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y., 154, the
question was whether Jim Fisk was
aggressor in the encounter between
the latter and Stokes. Evidence of
threats made by risk "that he
would first beggar Stokes and then
kill him" was refus :d by the trial
judge because the3 had not been
broug~ht to the knowledge of the
defendant. The Court of Appeals,
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through GROVER, J., declared that.
the evidenceought to have been ad-
mitted. "We thinl," said-the
Court, "that an attempt to execute
threats is equally probable when not
communicated to the party threat-
ened as when they are so; and
when, as in this case, the question
is- whether an attempt was made,
we can see no reason for excluding
them in the former that would not
be equally cogent for exclusion of
the latter; the latter being admis-
sible only for the reason that the
person threatened would the more
readily believe himsdlf endangered..
by the probability of an attempt to
execute such threats .... The
difference is only in degree." See
Keener v. State, 18 Ga., 194; Pul-
chette v. State, 22 Ala., 39; Camp-
bell, v. People, x6 Ill., 17.
In Wiggins v. People (sufira), it
is evident that for the purposes for
- "which the eidence was offered, it
was perfectly immaterial whether
•. the threats had been brought to the
knowledge of the defendant or not.
It was not to justify the act of the
defendant upon the theory that the
deceased acted at the encounter in
such a manner as to create the be-
lief that he was to execute his
threats, but to prove that the cause
of the defendant's shooting was the
deceaged's first shot.
The, authorities by no means
agree as to when the uncommuni-
cated threats of the deceased are
admissible. Some of the cases pro-
ceed upon the theory that inasmuch
as the prior declarations of the de-
fendant are admissible to show that
in killing he was executing a pre-
conceived intention, the defendant
is entitled to show that the deceased
made threats which he attempted
to execute when the defendant an-
ticipated him: Burns v. State, 49
Ala., 370; Roberts v. State, 68 Ala.,
156; Hor. and Thomp. Cas. on Self-
Defense; Campbell v. Ill., 16 Ill.,
17; People v. Taing, 53 Cal., 6o2.
Again, the animus of the defend-
anttoward the deceased may always
be shown to prove motive, etc.;
why should not the defendant be
allowed to prove the feeling of the
deceased toward him? In Keener
v. Georgia,' 18 Ga., 194, the Court
asked: "Ought not this conversa-
tion, whether communicated to
Keener or not, have been admitted
as a substantive fact or not, to show
'the malus animus or evil intent to-
ward Keener with which Reese
went to'the house that night? Lay-
ing aside all technical rules and
reasoning, -we ask,, withthe knowl-
edge of the mind and feelings of
the deceased disclosed by this wit-
ness, would we not, and ought not
the jury to .listen more indulgently
to the alleged apprehension of in-
jury, on the part of Keener, as well
as the facts and circumstances upon
which he relies to justify his con-
duct? .... .. Do not these facts
serve to illustrate the transaction ?"
Keener v. Ga., 18 Ga., 194.
The evidence of the uncommn-
nicated threats is inadmissible to
show the evil intent of the deceased
toward the defendant, because it is
immaterial, as a principle of sub-
stantive law, what the animus of
the deceased may have been. In
any event, the hatred of an enemy
never justilfes his murder. See
Edwards v. State, 55 Miss., 424;
Kenrick v. State, 55 Miss., 436;
Statev. Malloy, 44 Iowa, 1O4; Mor-
gan v. Coin., 14 Bush., io6; Black-
burn v. State, 23 Ohio St., 146.
It seems, then, that when an en-
counter occurs between two per-
sons, one of whom is killed and
the witnesses of the difficulty dif-
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